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Abstract
Online comment sections on news organizations'
social media pages provide a unique forum for ex-
ploring attitudes toward platform governance and
freedom of expression at the crossroads between
people, platforms, and news providers. Amid ample
political and policy interest, little empirical evidence
exists on user perceptions of platform governance.
Through survey studies in Germany (n = 1155) and
the United States (n = 1164), we provide a com-
parative perspective on responsibility attributions to-
ward different regulatory actors who may intervene
against problematic user comments: the state (law
enforcement), platform operators (Facebook), news
organizations, and users themselves. We explore this
against the backdrop of different notions of free
speech and cultural differences in the two countries.
We find that Germans attribute greater responsibility
for intervention to the state, Facebook, and news
organizations than Americans. They also assume
greater self‐responsibility. While support for free
speech did not impact responsibility attribution to
Facebook, news organizations, or the users them-
selves, people with greater general support for free
speech saw law enforcement as less responsible for
intervention. The results provide empirical evidence
for an integrated view of various regulatory actors
who complement each other in the governance of
online discussions.
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INTRODUCTION
Online comment sections on the social media pages of news outlets provide spaces for
readers to express their opinions and can constitute a forum for less‐represented views
(Dahlberg, 2011). Particularly, comment sections on social media pages with great reach
such as on Facebook are important fora of public debate (Esau et al., 2017). But these
online discussions also include the voices of the intolerant and hateful. A relevant share of
comments includes incivility in the forms of name‐calling, aspersion, lying, vulgarity, pe-
jorative speech, racism, and sexism (Chen, 2017; Coe et al., 2014). Empirical research has
documented various negative effects of incivility in comment sections on readers and so-
ciety (e.g., Anderson et al., 2014; Chen, 2017; Ziegele et al., 2018). Users, too, perceive
vitriolic comments as problematic and in need of intervention (Duggan, 2017). As a con-
sequence, societies must find ways to regulate such spaces to preserve the potential
benefits of comment sections for public debate and simultaneously protect minority voices.
This paper responds to calls for more survey‐based research on users' perspectives on
regulation and intervention (Einwiller & Kim, 2020). Ample political, policy, and research
attention has been paid to the legal frameworks that govern liability regimes for problematic
user‐generated content, particularly as these differ between countries and jurisdictions.
Additionally, many practitioners and scholars deal with the ways in which platforms and
news organizations handle moderation of this content (Daskal et al., 2020; Klonick, 2017).
This, too, varies between countries.
However, little empirical evidence is available on what users think about interventions by
these actors. Presumably, perceptions will reflect differences between countries. Public
opinion data can stimulate debates about existing intervention strategies of various actors.
In line with the idea of evidence‐based policymaking (Livingstone, 2013; Puppis & Van den
Bulck, 2019), such research can inform policymakers about the public's understanding of
media regulation, identify deviations between policy and public opinion, and help them to
justify or adjust their decisions (Lambe, 2002; Naab, 2016; Naab et al., 2019; Paek et al.,
2008). As Internet governance regimes consider the role that users themselves might play in
regulation, it is crucial to provide independent academic assessments of their attitudes.
Research such as ours can also contribute to platforms taming their reluctance toward
regulation if research shows user perceptions may be in favor of regulation. Studies on
public perceptions of free speech and regulation can also serve educational programs and
the long‐term protection of free speech. A comparative view might be able to generate a
deeper understanding of different national approaches. This seems particularly relevant as
online content is distributed and received transnationally, yet regulation mostly rests on
national actors.
This paper makes a novel contribution to our understanding of who the public thinks
should assume responsibility for interventions against problematic comments in a com-
parative framework between the United States and Germany. Comparative research on user
perceptions on regulation is theoretically important as it provides a better understanding of
different regulatory approaches to content governance. It also allows for an integrated view
on different actors of Internet governance who complement each other in the regulation of
online discussions. We acknowledge distinct cultural and country‐specific factors that impact
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freedom of expression and policy regulating technologies related to speech (Choi et al.,
2012). Most importantly, we consider that users' notions of social media regulation will
strongly depend on their support for freedom of expression, along with other factors.
We engage in a comparative study in Germany (n = 1155) and the United States
(n = 1164) to investigate peoples' perceptions of who should be responsible for interventions
against problematic comments on the Facebook pages of news outlets. Germany and the
United States are important cases: Germany is defined by a culture of freedom of expres-
sion firmly rooted in human dignity and the possibility of banning certain speech that
counters constitutional principles. In 2017, Germany even introduced rigid national legisla-
tion to create liability regimes for social media platforms through the Network Enforcement
Act (Heldt, 2019). The US conception of freedom of expression, on the contrary, is firmly
rooted in liberty and an almost religious reverence for the First Amendment. In the US,
technology regulation striving for more liability for social media platforms is similarly gath-
ering steam, pointing to the importance of considering attitudes toward regulation in con-
junction with attitudes toward free expression. Together, these two Western democracies
with their distinct approaches to freedom of expression provide a productive backdrop to
discuss user perceptions of who should be responsible to intervene in online news comment
sections on social media.
ACTORS INTERVENING IN COMMENT SECTIONS
We conceive of intervention as an umbrella term for a variety of activities related to dealing
with problematic user‐generated content, including deciding whether content should be
published, removing content that violates policies, and engaging with authors who deviate
from perceived standards (Masullo et al., 2020; Riedl et al., 2020). Various actors may
be involved in interventions against problematic speech in news comment sections. These
actors differ in the specific interventions that they might conduct, their license to do so, and
their efficacy. Regulation of traditional media content as well as speech was and still is
codified and executed by nation‐states and state‐like actors, such as the European Union
(Balkin, 2014). However, the emergence of technology companies and free license for users
to produce content has given way to a “pluralist model of speech regulation” (Balkin, 2017,
p. 1189). Regulation must now happen in a multi‐stakeholder fashion, wherein speech is
also governed by speakers themselves (e.g., citizens, news media, or other private cor-
porations). Under the term intervention we subsume these various activities of dealing with
problematic content—different regulatory actors and their grasp on regulation. We differ-
entiate the intervention strategies of these actors as follows:
The state as a regulatory entity legislates, maintains, and enforces laws through law
enforcement authorities. Laws created by elected representatives of the state govern re-
lationships between users, technology platforms, and state power. They qualify when and
how law enforcement may get involved or when platforms do not conduct themselves
adequately.
Platform operators, such as Facebook, host social media pages of news outlets, and set
up governance regimes of acceptable content that emerge within the perimeters of existing
laws and their own transnational and commercial interests. Their regulation is contingent on
trust and safety teams developing codes of conduct and community guidelines that enshrine
norms and rules of user engagement on platforms. These are then enacted and monitored
by algorithms, filters, human moderators, and combinations thereof (Myers West, 2018;
Roberts, 2019).
News organizations provide journalistic content that is then commented upon in the
news organizations' comment sections. Many organizations moderate uncivil comments by
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filtering or deleting them manually or with the help of automated tools (Stroud et al., 2015).
Furthermore, media organizations consider ways in which professional community mod-
erators could respond to comments (Naab et al., 2020; Wright et al., 2019; Ziegele & Jost,
2020). Generally, comment moderation by media organizations is assumed to be a crucial
element for successful online discussions (Kraut & Resnick, 2012; Wright, 2006), and em-
pirical research backs up that moderation, together with other policies, indeed benefits
civility (Ksiazek, 2015). Users, too, indicate a higher willingness to participate in moderated
over unmoderated online discussions (Wise et al., 2006).
Lastly, users can intervene against content perceived as problematic. Volunteer mod-
eration by users exists in various spaces, and researchers have referred to it as a form of
civic labor in the digital space (Matias, 2019), online civic intervention (Porten‐Chée et al.,
2020), or a specific type of corrective action (Lim, 2017; Naab et al., 2019; Ziegele et al.,
2019). Most social media platforms, including Facebook, provide the opportunity to flag the
content of others that potentially violates the commenting policy of the discussion provider.
Users can also choose to downvote comments they perceive as inappropriate or intervene
against comments of others through counter‐speech comments (Kalch & Naab, 2017; Kim,
2021; Naab et al., 2018, 2019). While in traditional media settings users were dependent on
institutions to take action against problematic content, social media empower ordinary users
to engage against content they perceive as problematic (Lim & Golan, 2011).
ATTRIBUTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERVENTION
The emergence of various actors with opportunities to intervene against content brings to
the fore what is referred to as the “problem of many hands” (Thompson, 2014, p. 259).
It describes the difficulty of attributing responsibility for specific decisions in complex pro-
cesses in which many parties are involved, spurring a need for “cooperative responsibility”
(Helberger et al., 2018, p. 1). Intervening against problematic comments hosted on the
pages of news outlets on social media may fall into shared responsibilities between all four
groups of actors that we outlined above—the state, platform operators, news organizations,
and users. The important question to ask is how this matches against user perceptions.
Consider, for example, if users primarily attribute responsibility to institutional actors, the
success of counter‐speech may be moot. Furthermore, users' ideas of who should intervene
could influence the public discourse on platform regulation, as well as show platforms what
their users want.
Previous literature has considered the attitudes of citizens (or more specifically of media
users) toward interventions against media content (Lambe, 2002). Empirical studies have
focused on users' approval of state interventions, for example, whether certain media
content should be censored, if communicators should be punished, or if content should be
assessed before publication (e.g., Golan & Lim, 2016; Lambe, 2002; Lim, 2017). Some
studies have asked if users approve of restrictive actions by media companies or Internet
providers or if they demand actions by these actors (Lo & Wei, 2005; Wei & Lo, 2007).
Rarely has research looked into whether users approve that other users intervene against
content (Wei & Lo, 2007) or examined self‐engagement against certain content (Lo & Wei,
2005; Rojas et al., 1996). Self‐responsibility is the “accountability of an individual or col-
lective actor for actions that have already been performed or are going to be performed in
the future” (Maier, 2019, p. 27). In comment sections, perceived self‐responsibility refers to
the question of whether people perceive that they themselves have a duty to engage in
interventions against uncivil online comments.
As research is typically interested in examining public approval of one specific actor and
their intervention(s), it seldomly allows for comparisons of perceived responsibility
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attributions between different actors. Our paper addresses this void and examines which
actors users perceive should intervene.
INFLUENCES OF NATIONAL BACKGROUND ON
RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTIONS
As we investigate individual responsibility attributions to various actors, we argue that these
attributions may be contingent on users' concepts of freedom of expression and their sup-
port for free speech in general. People with disparate national backgrounds as well as
people with different appreciation for free speech might differ in their perceptions of who
should be responsible to intervene against uncivil comments.
Attributing responsibility to the state
Germany and the United States, as most Western democracies, set strong constitutional
limits to potential state interference in media content including social media content like
online comments. However, differences emerge when thinking about the possibility of re-
stricting freedom of expression (Kommers, 2019).
In the United States, free speech is guaranteed by the First Amendment to its Con-
stitution, which forbids the government from banning speech, except in certain instances.
This concept of freedom of expression is best summarized as free speech exceptionalism
(Krotoszynski, 2015). It is tethered to individualism and independence—against the back-
drop of possible government interference (Krotoszynski, 2015; Nieuwenhuis, 2000; Post,
2017). American free speech harkens to the notion of a marketplace of ideas, much in the
sense of John Stuart Mill's articulations in On Liberty (Medeiros, 2017). In this purview,
some types of speech—for example, racist speech or other forms of hate speech—have to
be permitted (Nieuwenhuis, 2000), with the underlying idea that truth will emerge when
ideas compete in a marketplace of ideas. While the US approach to free speech may seem
far‐reaching and idiosyncratic, it is also not a carte blanche for any type of speech in any
setting and venue. Exceptions include speech that instigates breaking the law in a manner
that is both imminent and likely (Horwitz, 1991) or defamation, to name but a few. Fur-
thermore, support for the US view on freedom of expression remains in flux as society
changes (Chong & Levy, 2018; Medeiros, 2019).
The German Constitution prohibits any kind of state control of media content aiming to
censor before publication. Nevertheless, the German Constitution enshrines the notion of
human dignity above all (Carmi, 2007; Hawdon et al., 2017). This may entail limiting the
speech rights of some to protect the dignity of others (Krotoszynski, 2015). The German
concept of free speech assumes that to protect democracy itself it may be necessary to
forbid some forms of speech, namely speech that counters the very premises of the de-
mocratic system (Khan, 2013). Notably, whereas certain kinds of hate speech are prohibited
in Germany (e.g., Holocaust denial), similar laws do not exist in the United States. But even
though the German notion of free speech is more restrictive, restrictions to speech are still
viewed with suspicion (Nieuwenhuis, 2000).
Regarding the attitudes of Germans and Americans toward state interventions against
speech, Nieuwenhuis (2000) points to an important difference between the two peoples:
Germans trust the state more than Americans (Wike et al., 2017). For example, in 2011,
Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project (Kohut et al., 2011) published data mea-
suring people's attitudes toward the role of state interference in society. While in the United
States, 58% agreed that one should pursue life goals without state interference, in Germany,
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it was only 36%. In particular, when asked about the importance of the media reporting the
news without state censorship, 80% of Americans say that this is very important, but only
67% of Germans do so (Wike et al., 2019). Based on these country‐specific differences in
the concepts of free speech and in the attitudes toward state intervention, we hypothesize:
H1 Germans will attribute greater responsibility for interventions against problematic
online comments to law enforcement (the state) than Americans.
Attributing responsibility to platform operators
Interventions by platform operators are based on fundamentally different approaches in
Germany and the United States. The United States is known for its safe harbor protections
for technology companies, enshrined in Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of
1996 (Medeiros, 2017). This shields platforms from liability if their users post illegal content
and also allows platforms to behave as good Samaritans (Citron & Wittes, 2017): they may
police according to their own rules, while not being held accountable for errors or oversights.
Meanwhile, research finds that 64% of Americans think online services (including social
media platforms) should “play a major role” in tackling harassment (Duggan, 2017, p. 6).
What unites the two countries is the important role that Facebook plays; in both Germany
(22%) and the United States (35%) it is the most important social media site for news when
compared with other social media platforms (Newman et al., 2020).
In Germany, in a marked difference to the US approach, operators of social media
platforms are explicitly held accountable by the German Network Enforcement Act. Fol-
lowing this law, social media platforms with more than 2 million users in Germany must
respond to content takedown requests for manifestly unlawful content within specific time
frames (Heldt, 2019; Schulz, 2018). Otherwise, they might be fined up to 50 million Euros.
The law is criticized by civil society organizations, certain political parties, and academics
alike (Gollatz et al., 2018). They claim that its provisions could lead to “overblocking”—
preemptively censoring speech that may still be within the limits of the law (Daskal et al.,
2020). It is also criticized because the German state effectively outsources the policing of
speech and its penal code to predominantly US‐based private corporations. Despite this
critique, survey research at the time found support among the German population for the
draft law: 43% of Germans were definitely in favor of a law regulating hate speech and fake
news. About a third of the population was also concerned about the ramifications such a law
might have for freedom of expression (Inhoffen, 2017).
Considering that Germany had passed a law that assigns responsibility to social media
operators, and that the German public is somewhat familiar with the law and surrounding
discourses, one could assume that Germans would display greater support for interventions
in comment sections by platforms than Americans would. We posit the following:
H2 Germans will attribute greater responsibility for interventions against problematic
online comments to Facebook than Americans.
Attribution of responsibility to news organizations
While research has suggested that news organizations are important actors in the regulation of
comment sections (Wright, 2006), little is known about cultural differences regarding users'
perceptions of content moderation by news outlets. Germany and the United States lend
themselves to a comparative perspective as their media systems are substantively different.
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Germany has a strong public service broadcasting system, and state intervention—for example
in the form of press subsidies—is the norm, whereas the US system touts the free market
(Brüggemann et al., 2014). Evidence suggests further that Germans trust the news media more
than Americans. Research on trust in the media finds that more than 40% of Germans indicate
they trust the news, while less than a third of Americans do (Hanitzsch et al., 2018; Newman
et al., 2020). Assuming that a general level of trust in the news media translates to trusting news
organizations in their approach to intervening in comment sections, we posit:
H3 Germans attribute greater responsibility for interventions against problematic online
comments to news organizations than Americans.
Assuming self‐responsibility
In the United States, 60% of people think that bystanders who witness online harassment
should play a major role in tackling harassment (Duggan, 2017). In Germany, survey re-
search shows that approximately 20% of Internet users say they have engaged in some
form of counterspeech against hate speech already (Landesanstalt für Medien NRW, 2020).
Einwiller and Kim (2020) analyzed policy documents in which platforms across the United
States, Germany, Korea, and China articulate their approaches toward harmful online
communication. Among other dimensions, they find that platforms rarely encourage coun-
terspeech explicitly. Perhaps the most prominent example of counterspeech—when it
occurs—is the social online movement #ichbinhier (i.e., #iamhere; Ziegele et al., 2019). The
Facebook group, a spin‐off of the Swedish group #jagärhär, was founded in 2016 and
currently has more than 45,000 members. The group strives to alleviate the quality of online
news discourse in comment sections through collective action—by intervening in uncivil
conversations with respectful counterspeech (Ley, 2018). To our knowledge, no similar
initiative exists in the United States. This suggests that Americans compared with Germans
might be less willing to assume self‐responsibility to intervene in comment sections.
However, when comparing attitudes toward individualism and the capacity to bring about
change, Americans assume more individual agency to change things than Germans. For
example, asked whether people “disagree that success in life is pretty much determined by
forces outside our control,” only 31% of Germans but as much as 57% of Americans said
that they did (Wike, 2016). Indeed, internal political efficacy and social media self‐efficacy
beliefs are positively related to participation in social media (Velasquez & LaRose, 2015).
Additionally, survey research on members of the group #iamhere suggests that perceived
self‐efficacy in writing counter‐speech increases the members' likelihood to engage against
problematic comments. However, general political efficacy had no effect (Ziegele et al.,
2019). Given the lack of a clear direction from the literature, we pose a research question:
RQ1 Is there a difference between Germans and Americans in assuming self‐
responsibility for interventions against problematic online comments?
INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT FOR FREE SPEECH
Support for free speech also matters at the individual level: Some people are more able or
willing to consider the value of free speech as a general good to individuals and society (e.g.,
World Values Survey, 2019). An individual's appreciation for free speech is a crucial in-
dicator for the status of free speech as it gives information on its importance for those
expected to exercise and advocate this right (Inglehart, 1997).
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Various studies have highlighted that people who place greater value on free speech are
more inclined to grant it even to undesirable or extreme expressions and show less approval
of restrictions (Paek et al., 2008). However, research has not yet considered whether the
individual level of appreciation of free speech also influences individuals' assessment of
regulatory actors.
Influences on responsibility attribution for interventions
In light of scholarship insinuating that “[o]ne of the great evils free speech is meant to
defend against is a state orthodoxy” (Corbin, 2009, p. 993), we consider how individual
support for free speech relates to responsibility attributions to the state to intervene
against problematic user comments: We expect people who display stronger support for
free speech to hold more skeptical attitudes toward state interference in comment sec-
tions. This is based on the idea that any authoritative state restriction of free speech
might be viewed as potential censorship and thus a harm to freedom of expression.
Legally (in Germany and the United States), censorship occurs only when the state
restricts content (Lambe, 2002).
People who strongly support free speech would also be expected to be suspicious not
only about state interference but also about interventions by other institutionalized actors,
such as Facebook, who hold a dominant position in society. We consider Facebook an
institutionalized actor as it constitutes a formal organization that governs the individual
behaviors of its staff and of users of the platform. Facebook presents its own terms of
service including how inappropriate content is dealt with. Beyond this immediate context, the
company has a tremendous impact on online ecosystems through its “algorithmic and data‐
driven practices” (Caplan & boyd, 2018, p. 2). Its corporate impact has led toward mono-
polization, to the extent that in December 2020, the US Federal Trade Commission laun-
ched an antitrust lawsuit against the company (Kang & Isaac, 2020). Research has shown
that users who indicate greater commitment to free speech are also more skeptical toward
restrictions that Facebook or law enforcement employ to limit uncivil online comments than
those users who have lower commitment to free speech (Naab et al., 2019). Therefore, we
postulate:
H4 Greater individual support for free speech decreases attribution of responsibility for
interventions against problematic comments (a) to law enforcement and (b) to
Facebook.
News media are often conceptualized as the Fourth Estate, observing and controlling
other democratic institutions, and, thus, fulfilling an important societal function (Hampton,
2010). The media's very existence depends on free speech and protection from interference
by the state and powerful groups. In this vein, the news media may be perceived as an
appropriate actor to moderate citizens' expression without endangering free speech. On the
contrary, the moderation strategies of news organizations have also been criticized for
inadequately limiting the Internet's potential for citizen participation and free speech
(Janssen & Kies, 2005; Wright, 2006). Additionally, both in Germany and the United States,
a significant part of society perceives the news media as untrustworthy and part of a culprit
elite (e.g., Fawzi, 2019). Given the lack of empirical evidence specifically regarding inter-
ventions against problematic comments, we ask:
RQ2 Does support for free speech influence attribution of responsibility for interventions
against problematic online comments to news organizations?
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Previous research did not find any impact of individual support for free speech on user
interventions against uncivil comments (Naab, 2016; Naab et al., 2019). This is surprising,
because one might expect that supporters of free speech, in particular, would rely on the
self‐regulatory power of engaging in discussions. Against this backdrop, we ask:
RQ3 Does support for free speech influence whether people assume self‐responsibility
for interventions against problematic online comments?
Relationship between national background and support for free
speech
Data comparing support for free speech between Germans and Americans indicate that
Germans, on average, show a slightly higher appreciation for free speech as a human right.
For example, the Pew Research Center (Wike et al., 2019) found that 77% of Americans
state that it is very important to have free speech in their country, compared with 86% of
Germans. In line with this, data on people's individual evaluations of freedom of expression
have been continuously gathered by the World Values Survey (2019): More than 20% of
Germans compared with 17% of Americans chose “protecting freedom of speech” as their
most important value. With regard to attitudes toward freedom on the Internet, research has
found that support for freedom of expression on the Internet and on the necessity for
governance to alleviate harm range at about the same level in Germany and the United
States, at around 85% (Shen, 2017). Based on this data, we hypothesize:




The German and the US survey obtained Institutional Review Board approval on November
20, 2018. The German survey was launched in December 2018, and the US survey followed
in January 2019. Procedures for both surveys were identical, but questions were worded in
the German language for the German study and in English for the US study. We recruited
US and German participants through Dynata,1 an international survey company that pro-
vides researchers with access to panels that aim to represent the demographics of the adult
population in each country. Table 1 presents the demographics of the US sample (n = 1164)
and the German sample (n = 1155) and compares the final sample after data cleaning with
the demographics of the Internet population in each country.
Measures
Attribution of responsibility for interventions against uncivil online comments on the Face-
book pages of news outlets was measured with one item for each type of actor (“In comment
sections on the Facebook pages of news media outlets, there are often comments that many
people perceive as offensive, inappropriate, or problematic. In your opinion, who is re-
sponsible for doing something about such comments?”): “law enforcement,” “Facebook,”
“the news organizations who maintain the respective Facebook pages,” and “me myself.”
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Agreement was measured on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.
Table 2 presents the frequencies by country. Table 3 presents the correlations between
responsibility attribution to the four actors.
Support for free speech was measured with three items adapted from Rojas et al.
(1996): “Everybody should have the freedom to publicly say what they believe to be true,”
“No matter how controversial an idea is, an individual should be able to express it publicly,”
and “All individuals should have the right to openly express their ideas, no matter how
prejudiced they might be.” Agreement was measured on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree
to 5 = strongly agree (German sample: M = 4.05, SD = 0.85, α = 0.88; US sample: M = 3.80,
SD = 0.96, α = 0.88).
Country of the participants was coded 0 =Germany and 1 = United States.
Controls. Socio‐demographic variables have been shown to be related to attitudes to-
ward media regulation and free speech (Lambe, 2002). Moreover, news consumption, social
media use as well as social media political self‐efficacy are associated with individuals'
social media engagement for their causes, their perception of harmful content and
TABLE 1 Demographics of participants compared with the German/US Internet populations
German survey US survey
Internet
population (%) Sample (%)
Internet
population (%) Sample (%)
Gender
Male 50 48 50 41
Female 50 52 50 59
Race/ethnicity (US only)
White ‐ ‐ 70 75
Black or African‐American ‐ ‐ 13 10
Asian or Asian‐American ‐ ‐ 5 3
Other ‐ ‐ 12 5
Hispanic (yes/no) ‐ ‐ 15 12
Age
18–29 19 15 24 20
30–49 38 36 36 40
50–64 30 34 25 26
65+ 13 15 15 15
Education
High school or less (US), level
1 (GER)
29 21 17 4
Secondary (US), level 2 (GER) 34 31 17 20
Some college (US), level 3 (GER) 16 27 33 39
College + (US), level 4 (GER) 21 22 33 37
N 1155 1164
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intervention against such (Kalch & Naab, 2017; Kenski et al., 2017; Naab et al., 2018;
Velasquez & LaRose, 2015; Ziegele et al., 2019). Thus, we measured gender, age, edu-
cation (0 = secondary education or less; 1 =more), and political ideology (0 = liberal;
10 = conservative; German sample: M = 4.84, SD = 2.00; US sample: M = 5.06, SD = 3.10).
Furthermore, we measured Facebook use for news and commenting on news with four
items such as “I read content from news media outlets on Facebook”; 1 = never; 6 = very
often; German sample: M = 3.26, SD = 1.37, α = 0.88; US sample: M = 3.24, SD = 1.50,
α = 0.91). We measured Facebook political self‐efficacy with six items adapted from
Velasquez and LaRose (2015) such as “I am able to use Facebook to express my political
views”; 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree; German sample: M = 2.56, SD = 1.06,
α = 0.92; US sample: M = 2.75, SD = 1.22, α = 0.95). We included these variables in the
analyses to control for their influence.
In the survey, we did not present participants with a stimulus of a problematic user
comment but asked for their general perception of who should intervene. Thus, we mea-
sured whether participants generally perceived user comments to be more of a benefit or a
threat to society (1 = significant threat; 5 = significant benefit; German sample: M = 2.88,
SD = 1.01; US sample: M = 2.93, SD = 0.96). We added this control variable to the analyses.
RESULTS
We computed four hierarchical linear regressions to test our hypotheses (Table 4). The
participants' attribution of responsibility for intervention to the four actors served as de-
pendent variables in the four regressions: (1) responsibility attribution to law enforcement,
TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics of attribution of responsibility to various actors by country
Germany (n = 1155) US (n = 1164)
M SD M SD
Facebook 3.89 1.18 3.70 1.25
The news organizations who maintain the respective
Facebook pages
3.79 1.14 3.58 1.25
Law enforcement 3.30 1.24 2.60 1.25
Me myself 2.94 1.37 2.81 1.38















Note: N = 2319.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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(2) to Facebook, (3) to news organizations, (4) self‐responsibility. In Step 1 of the four
regression models, we included the control variables age, gender, education, and political
ideology. In Step 2, we included the participants' usage of Facebook for news, their self‐
efficacy to use Facebook for political purposes, and their perception of user comments.
In Step 3, we introduced the independent variables country of origin and support for free
speech. All variance inflation factors (VIF) were below the value of 1.7, indicating no sig-
nificant multicollinearity issues.
The regression models show significant influences of the participants' country on attri-
buting responsibility to the four actors. Germans attribute higher responsibility to all three
institutionalized actors (0 =German, 1 = United States; Model 1: law enforcement:
β = −0.278, p < 0.001; Model 2: Facebook: β = −0.068, p = 0.002; Model 3: news
TABLE 4 Hierarchical multiple regression analyses predicting attribution of responsibility to law enforcement,














Gender −0.024 −0.005 0.066** −0.018
Age 0.002 0.053* 0.091*** 0.066**
Educatione −0.020 −0.050* 0.003 0.005
Political ideologyf −0.037 −0.101*** −0.090*** 0.008
Step 2
Facebook news useg 0.053* 0.030 0.040 0.125***
Facebook political self‐
efficacyh
0.100*** 0.141*** 0.140*** 0.180***
Perception of user
commentsi
−0.030 −0.108*** −0.099*** 0.004
Step 3
Country of originj −0.278*** −0.068** −0.091*** −0.060**
Support for free speechh −0.061** −0.010 0.042 0.002
N 2312 2312 2312 2312
Corr. R2 0.090*** 0.038*** 0.045*** 0.073***
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
aF (9, 2302) = 26.441, p < 0.001; Step 3: ΔR2 = 0.069, Sig. ΔR2 p < 0.001.
bF (9, 2302) = 11.132, p < 0.001; Step 3: ΔR2 = 0.004, Sig. ΔR2 p = 0.008.
cF (9, 2302) = 17.962, p < 0.001; Step 3: ΔR2 = 0.010, Sig. ΔR2 p < 0.001.
dF (9, 2302) = 21.364, p < 0.001; Step 3: ΔR2 = 0.003, Sig. ΔR2 p = 0.019.
e0 = Secondary education or less, 1 = secondary education or more.
f0 = Liberal, 10 = conservative.
g1 = Never, 6 = very often.
h1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree.
i1 = Significant threat, 5 = significant benefit.
j0 = German, 1 = US American.
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organizations: β = −0.091, p < 0.001), supporting H1, H2, and H3. Germans also assume
higher self‐responsibility (β = −0.060, p = 0.005), answering RQ1.
Greater support for free speech has a significant negative influence on responsibility
attribution to law enforcement (β = −0.061, p = 0.004), confirming H4a. It does not, however,
influence responsibility attribution to Facebook (β = −0.010, p = 0.654, H4b), news organi-
zations (β = −0.042, p = 0.054, RQ2), or self‐responsibility (β = 0.002, p = 0.938, RQ3).
A t test showed that Germans display a significantly greater support for free speech
(n = 1155, M = 4.05, SD = 0.85) than Americans (n = 1164, M = 3.80, SD = 0.96),
t(2288.338) = 6.583, p < 0.001. This supports H5.
DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was to shed light on user attitudes toward a particular type of reg-
ulation of user‐generated content: interventions against problematic comments on the social
media pages of online news outlets. Through a survey, we uncovered attitudes about who
users think should be in charge of interventions while also factoring in important antecedents
of responsibility attribution: individual support for free speech as well as national back-
ground. We were interested in how Germans and Americans allocated responsibility for
interventions against problematic comments to different actors: the state (law enforcement),
platforms (Facebook), news organizations, and users themselves.
The data indicated medium‐sized correlations between attributions of responsibility to
the various actors: If people see a need for intervention, they more likely attribute the
responsibility to do so to multiple actors. In both, the United States and Germany, in
the ranking of responsibility attributions, Facebook came first, and news organizations came
second. In Germany, this was followed by law enforcement, and then users, whereas in the
US law enforcement came in last. This demonstrates the expectation for platforms and news
outlets to take an overt role in managing problematic content.
When considering support for free speech, we found that this only negatively impacted
responsibility attribution to law enforcement. This suggests that people who strongly support
free speech are suspicious about state interference and fear potential harm to freedom of
expression. However, support for free speech did not negatively affect responsibility attri-
bution to Facebook. We can only speculate what may be underlying reasons: People may
experience a strong need for regulation to an extent that it overwhelms possible skepticism
against the platform operator. Perhaps people do not reflect on the power that said actor
wages over free expression. It is up to future research to explore if this is a result of trust in
Facebook or perceived helplessness toward online hate.
Moreover, support for free speech does not increase attribution of responsibility to the
news organizations who maintain the Facebook pages. It seems that users do not perceive
news organizations to have an explicit duty to control public discourse. Alternatively, it is
worth investigating if users have internalized the legal norm that censorship only refers to
restrictions by the state (not interventions by platform operators and news organizations).
This could also explain why support for free speech was unrelated to attributions of re-
sponsibility to other actors but law enforcement (Chong, 1993).
Support for free speech does also not increase assumed self‐responsibility of the users.
This is in line with previous research that also did not find any impact of individual support for
free speech on user interventions against uncivil comments (Naab, 2016; Naab et al., 2019).
Those users who appreciate free speech probably object to intervention in general and
emphasize a free exchange, even of harmful content. Alternatively, they might distrust the
idea that users themselves are able or willing to maintain online discussions through their
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self‐regulatory power. A reason for this might be that, as user interventions address pro-
blematic content, their actions may also coincidentally leverage that very content they try to
oppose. The reason is that (even disapproving) engagement with comments can increase
their (algorithmic) visibility. This poses practical challenges to counter‐speech in algorithmic
settings.
When considering culture as a factor impacting responsibility attribution via the proxy of a
participant being from Germany or the United States, we found that support for free speech
differed substantially between the two countries. Germans displayed stronger support for
free speech. This is congruent with previous survey studies (Wike et al., 2019; World Values
Survey, 2019).
In line with prior research, we found that Germans attributed higher responsibility for
interventions in comment sections to the state and its law enforcement agencies than
Americans. This finding supports the notion that the German conception of free speech,
which “merges liberal constitutionalism with a strong commitment to social solidarity”
(Kommers, 2019, p. 561), is also reflected in the attitudes of the people. In tandem with
stronger support for state intervention in Germany than in the United States (Nieuwenhuis,
2000), it is conceivable that Germans would favor interventions against online comments by
law enforcement to a greater extent than Americans.
Our literature review led toward the assumption that Germans were more in favor of
interventions by Facebook against uncivil comments on Facebook news pages. The
empirical data shows that Germans attribute more responsibility to Facebook than
Americans. It is possible that, due to a continuous debate about the Network Enforce-
ment Act in Germany in the media and a “politicisation of the discussion” (Gollatz &
Jenner, 2018, para. 1), Germans arrived at a position that assumes Facebook should
take responsibility for what happens on its platform. The political debate about and media
coverage of the law may have contributed to the public consciousness, so that it in-
stigated deliberative processes among the German public about responsibility attribution
in platform regulation.
In line with research finding higher media trust in Germany than in the United States
(Newman et al., 2020), our study found that Germans attributed more responsibility for
interventions to news organizations than Americans. This ties in with the conceptual idea
that, at least in Germany, news outlets are perceived as responsible stewards of civic
debate, in addition to their role as the Fourth Estate (Hampton, 2010). Future research
needs to elaborate whether this difference is in fact tied to divergent levels of trust in news
media, or if this relates to perceived power to impose sanctions and control public debates in
social media.
We find that Germans assume greater self‐responsibility in interventions against
uncivil online comments than Americans. This is contradictory to what survey research
suggests, namely that Americans are more convinced they have agential power to bring
about change than Germans (Wike, 2016)—at least with regard to the self‐regulatory
power in online discussions. Perhaps, such faith to bring about change is contextual to
self‐actualization, and, therefore, less applicable to interventions against problematic
speech online in the United States. In contrast, the results corroborate the observation
that social movements like #iamhere, that promote user responsibility for counter‐speech
in online discussion, have a stronger basis in Germany than in the United States. Against
the backdrop of public debates around the increasing challenges of handling uncivil
comments, fake news, and social bots in social media, the task of intervening against
problematic comments might seem overwhelming for platforms. Giving users more
responsibility and agency to play their part may be a complementary and fruitful path
forward.
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LIMITATIONS
Our findings and interpretations must be seen in light of several limitations: We assumed
various differences between Germans and Americans based on cultural heritage and
aggregated survey data comparing these populations. We can only speculate if the dif-
ferences that we found between Germans and Americans are indeed grounded in
the arguments we make. Given the promising results, it seems a fruitful path for future
research to measure the assumed influential factors on the individual level and use more
comprehensive models to test the effects we show in this paper. This would entail
measuring each participant's concept of free speech, a range of variables measuring
national culture more holistically, trust in the state, platform operators, and news media as
well as attitudes toward civic engagement. Furthermore, expanding the scope of future
studies beyond Germany and the United States would yield interesting results beyond a
western context of liberal democracy.
The survey did not provide respondents with a predetermined definition of the kinds of
comments in need of intervention. The question left it up to the respondents' imagination
which comments this might include. This allows the participants to make up their mind about
comments they individually perceive as worthy of intervention. Yet it also allows for ambi-
guity in whether participants' ideas of what constitutes “offensive, inappropriate, or proble-
matic” comments were comparable. Future studies could introduce stimulus‐based designs
that present preselected comments to participants. However, this will reduce the general-
izability of the results and be further complicated by the need to translate stimuli between
countries. Additionally, the study did not provide information as to what type of responsibility
(beyond “intervention”) the different regulatory actors should carry out. Future studies should
provide more nuanced measurements for “attribution of responsibility.” In combination with a
differentiated measurement of the content of problematic comments, this will also allow
investigating if participants expect varied types of interventions for different kinds of
objectionable content. Finally, we focused on individual perceptions of online comments on
Facebook because that is where news organizations increasingly locate their online
discussions (Su et al., 2018). Expanding the reach to include and encompass other social
media platforms would be a worthwhile endeavor for future research as well. These studies
could also particularly consider perceptions of Internet users with lower education levels as
these were slightly underrepresented in the current samples.
CONCLUSION
This study contributes to a better understanding of the preferences people have about who
should be in charge of discussion spaces in two Western democracies. By reflecting on
support for free speech in Germany and the United States and measuring perceptions of
responsibility attribution in both countries, we contribute to a more comprehensive picture of
user perceptions of regulatory actors involved in platform governance regimes. Specifically,
we find that an individual's level of support for free speech impacts whether they see law
enforcement in charge of comment regulation. While Germans support free speech more
than Americans, they also think, more than Americans do, that the actors who should be
responsible for taking care of problematic content are Facebook, the state, news organi-
zations, and the users themselves. Against this background, nourishing freedom of
expression in tandem with providing mechanisms of speech governance that allow users to
intervene themselves are important next steps in thinking about the future of platform
governance.
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